Michael H. Goldhaber

[Note: this is another entry in my attempt to make sense of the crash and see how it is tied to the Attention Economy. Some earlier entries are here, here, here, here and here.]

I attended an informative, thought-provoking and amusing talk by Prof. Brad DeLong of UC Berkeley on Tuesday on the financial crisis “of 2007-2009” (he expects the crisis to have diminished by the end of this year). (The talk was part of the OLLI series on the crisis).

DeLong is primarily an expert on finance, and perhaps for that reason I felt his focus was a bit off. Along with most economists he seems to assume:

1. Nothing has fundamentally changed; industrial capitalism will go on much as it has “once the crisis is over”
2. There is no problem with the assumption of endless growth and endless increases in productivity, and no contradiction between these and full employment
3. The source of the crisis is fundamentally financial in nature.

I disagree with all three of these assumptions. (Of course, finance is far from my specialty. )As DeLong made clear, unlike most recessions since 1950, this one was not caused the Federal Reserve’s raising interest rates in order to dampen inflation. Further, a graph at the beginning of his talk, showing employment as a percentage of adults  (I assume from 18 to 65 years old) revealed that while employment ratios grew tremendously from 1970 on as a result of feminism and women’s  entering the workforce in droves (voluntarily or not), the employment ratio fell sharply in 2000-2002, and did not recover at all completely before this current sharp downturn.

In my view the unwarranted growth of the financial sector over recent decades, and especially more recently, covered up declining incomes among much of the populace. Further, the issuance of low cost and even poorly vetted mortgages and other forms of credit, including home equity lines, covered over the reduced buying power of ordinary workers. That arose from the more intense international and automation-related competition of the past decade and a half. Construction work cannot easily be off-shored, but it was eventually bound to come to a halt or at least sharply slowed down. So the lowered purchasing power, which  was hidden by too-great credit expansion and construction work combined, is now visible. Increasing credit and even a stimulus package, unless it is to be repeated again and again, cannot prevent this buying power reduction. Also, as labor productivity continues to rise, barring hugely increased government spending (on what?) consumption cannot reasonably be expected to rise at a rate that will allow full employment.

What of the financial  sector itself, with its rich profits in recent years and high wages and other remuneration? To be sure, capitalism requires a financial sector to move credit to new areas, etc. But how big should it be? Just as computer-based automation has cut jobs or lowered wages in other sectors, it should have done this even more dramatically in finance.  Given any fixed set of financial transactions, most steps are routine and can easily be turned over to computers, as anyone engaged in personal online banking, purchasing and bill paying should be well aware.

But rapid computation and rapid money transfers via the Internet, etc., have allowed a new  kind of financial activity, including all the vaunted derivatives. While some minimal level of trade in such things may have had beneficial effects outside the confines of finance itself, to a large extent it has become a sector that operates completely in its own sphere. The only actual connection to the rest of the world are the dividends to bank-holding-company shareholders, returns to hedge-fund investors, and the super-high bonuses paid to many finance-sector workers. Many of these gains, of course, were reinvested, and have now partly or wholly disappeared, but others were spent on various luxuries, which did create considerable employment outside the pure financial sphere.

The essential activity of this sector, however, amounts to the equivalent of shaving the coins passing through, but, using electronic funds transfer and operating digitally, the returns per finance worker appear much larger, and there are no tell-tale shaved coins to be seen. To the extent the financial activity encourages investment by outsiders in the stockmarket or other kinds of instruments, it also appears to create wealth by inflating purely financial prices, such as the prices of bundled mortgages or of many common stocks. But that mythical wealth simply disappeared in the downturn.

Risky financial shenanigans, as DeLong eloquently argued, are hard to prevent or regulate, but they can be seen as adding only mythically to the GDP. When the balloon is punctured, the more accurate state of affairs returns, though very much to many people’s discomfort.

My uses of terms such as “mythical” and “accurate” in the preceding two paragraphs is perhaps slightly slanted. If prices are what people will pay, these inflated values are no less accurate or no more mythical than any others. So let me instead suggest that in addition to what may be called industrial-product value and what might be referred to as attention value, the finance sector creates an additional sort of value of its own, call it “transactional value”, that has little basis in either of the others and has a balloon-like quality of growing until it bursts, which describes what happened recently and what can happen again. But the underlying question as to why it happened now is not fully explained by that description.

Further into his talk, DeLong presented a slide stating that, of 80 trillion dollars of financial assets before the meltdown, only one trillion had been invested in bad mortgages. Nonetheless net financial assets have declined by 25%.  The other 19 trillion were, according to him, reduced because too many assets have been discounted either because of risk or because of lack of information. I see it somewhat differently. Assets, such as stocks, were overvalued before the crash on the same basis as mortgages, that is with the assumption of endless growth. For example, stocks are priced to reflect prevailing assumptions not about present profit levels continuing but about future growth of profits. In most cases these assumptions were just hopeful and not fully warranted. Because there was so much money floating around, it had to go somewhere and ended up in the stock-market, driving prices up. Anyone who had invested in a typical stock earlier saw the asset growing in value, even if there was nothing besides these more recent stock purchases underlying that appreciation in price. Similarly, new inventions and commercial real estate, as well as other sectors, had gained because of unwarrantedly rosy assumptions. Now that  it is evident that Americans are in debt and have no further home equity to draw on, they are on the whole in a much worse position to purchase anything, or even to pay off loans. Thus the current credit crunch and reduced spending are not due to jitters beyond the mortgage crisis but directly related to it.

In the question period, someone asked DeLong whether the crisis was partly caused by flat average wages since 2000. Pausing to consider this question, as if for the first time, DeLong opined that that was not a very significant factor in the current troubles. Had the questioner asked whether the growing inequality of incomes and wealth between the rich and everyone else were  partially at fault, would the answer have been the same? Had wages risen as in earlier periods, keeping pace with productivity growth, the need for borrowing would have been much less, so either ordinary people would have been able to save, or consumption would have been at a higher level. The financial sector would not have gotten so far out of balance. So a key question is, just why did wages not grow?

One answer is that the existence of home equity and easy borrowing lowered labor pressure on wages, but I doubt that is the whole answer. Workers were afraid to ask for  wage increases, because the more they took home, the greater the danger that their work would somehow be off-shored or automated. If, as I have suggested repeatedly, we are moving towards an attention economy,we are the stage in which income crudely speaking tends to reflect the attention a person gets. DeLong gets paid more than a typical factory worker, for instance, because he gets more attention. Still, he get not nearly as much attention as Alex Rodriguez, and that is reflected in the difference in their emoluments. Higher productivity would increase incomes only to the extent that the workers in the automated factories impart some essential aspects of themselves; if they are fully replaceable, they remain pretty much invisible. Within the ordinary manufacturing and services sector, only the designers of processes and products have much chance to get attention, however indirectly. But even they must compete for attention. That leads to a limit to growth. All acts of consumption are acts of attention paying, and there is only so much attention to go around.

Why has this not always been so? Because the competition for attention has kept heating up of late. Thus attention inequality and wealth inequality partly track each other. The financial wealth that is now disappearing was somewhat outside that, so attention and wealth May be even more fully aligned in the future. Insofar as this is an industrial depression, more off-shoring and faster productivity growth will coincide with further downward wage pressure and more invisibility for ordinary workers and for many corporations that do not have compelling visions at their heart.

Finally, let me add some thoughts about the stimulus and its likely effects. I’ve long been a Keynesian as far as the standard economy, so I do welcome a stimulus, and wish it were even larger. DeLong didn’t say much about it in  his talk, although generally agreeing with me so far. But he does say more on his blog. He suggests there that the ‘multiplier” could be greater than one. In other words, for every dollar the government spends in stimulus, more than dollar’s increase in GDP could result. DeLong cites studies of various American wars to argue that in the past the multiplier was about 0.8. I must say I would have thought it would have been larger. To some extent the multiplier must depend on how rapidly money turns over, that is how quickly money can move from pocket to pocket. It also depends on how  many times the money is spent in the community in question as opposed say to leaving the country. As a crude guess, we should now expect some of the money to be put into savings or to pay off existing loans, but since banks are unwilling to lend, those payments may not help create further employment. Also, money spent on standard consumer goods will partially leave the country, probably at a higher rate than in the past. Thus the stimulus will certainly put people to work but not do quite as much as is hoped.

But the idea of the stimulus package is also to help in other ways, by preparing the US capitalist economy to work better, so that further stimuli are not needed. Of that, I am skeptical. On its own, the stimulus will not do much to create greater equality. It also can do little to redirect rising attention inequality which will be of increasing importance. It will not prevent off-shoring of industrial jobs in both manufacturing and services, nor prevent increases in productivity. While I am an ardent supporter of good education, I also do not believe that increased education or even better eduction necessarily translates into high-end jobs for everyone. (See also here , third graf from the end). Some people will be able to turn their educations into getting more attention for themselves, but others probably won’t. One can hope that educators will instill a necessary sense of community, but at present that seems like a long shot.

I think we are entering a new stage of history, and we don’t yet see how it will play out well for most people.

In ancient Athens’s Agora, in medieval Venice’s Rialto neighborhood, and in small village market squares everywhere, the marketplace for ideas — that is where attention was exchanged —commingled with the market for goods. Socrates wandered around the Agora talking with his disciples and enemies, according to Plato. But he and they spent little time trying out or examining the wares, or in bargaining over goods. Others, say in Cairo’s souks up until today, spend much time engaged in conversation and in bargaining, and would be shocked and disturbed to have their first price accepted by  customer. In these cases attention and shopping are intermingled, but still separate kinds of activity. Today, in more westernized places the relationship is different but still crucial.

Consumer spending is what is said to keep the American — and therefore the world’s — market economy afloat. In recent years this has required most consumers to go into debt, either through home loans, credit cards or both. Today it is increasingly hard to get such loans, because all the banks are afraid of lending. Meanwhile,  a substantial and growing  proportion of Americans have no way to take on more debt and still pay it back. But even if that were not so, consumption might not head up forever. In a previous post I discussed the attention costs of consumption. But there is another side to consuming, which helps explain why Americans have loved to shop. It can be described as simply this: Shopping is an avenue for getting attention. At, least, it seems to be that, sometimes even when it’s not. Let me list some of the ways shopping offers attention.

Illusory Attention

Yesterday I went to the hub of shopping in the Bay area, the few blocks around Union Square, SF. Within fairly easy walking distance is everything from the extremely downscale Burlington Coat Factory to the upscale Barney’s New York. Also, Bloomingdales, Nordstrom’s, Macy’s, Nieman-Marcus, H & S, and Saks Fifth Avenue, along with Crate and Barrel, Apple, Virgin Records, Border’s Books and many other name-brand chain stores, along with a number of discount jewelry stores and many others. Together these emporia function as a kind of gigantic museum of what designers have designed, technologists have implemented, musicians and artists and jewelers and writers have created— all as curated by the store’s buyers and display managers. Plenty of things to pay attention to, but by the same token a great deal of illusory attention. (Illusory attention is the attention you feel you are getting, as if in direct address to you, when in fact the creator in question is unaware of your specific existence or very nearly unaware of it.) You could receive illusory attention by going to an actual museum, say, but you get much of the same just by looking around in stores and shops, or eating in restaurants, especially those with notable restaurateurs or chefs behind them.

Being Attended to While Shopping

Another thing happens, at least minutely, when you shop. The salespeople pay at least a little and sometimes a lot of attention to you. You expect to be noticed and perhaps cosseted; you expect to be smiled at, thanked, perhaps complimented on your taste, told what you should and should not buy, offered reassurances that the possible recipient of your purchase will love it. (It doesn’t seem to matter that the clerk offering such assurances knows absolutely nothing about the intended recipient of a gift; they just know the recipient will love it, and sometimes this remarkable knowledge evidently seems compelling and reassuring to the customer.

Attention Paid to Gift-Givers

A high proportion of all purchases are made around the now traditional gift-giving holidays, and many  — though by no means all –are actually bought as gifts. Some of these gifts were requested, but many are shots in the dark, which may or may not turn out to be something the recipient actually wants or is happy to have. Many such gifts end up never used, instead stored away and forgotten, a kind of Keynesian boost to the world’s market economy, but still hoped to bring about some kind of gratitude and attention paid to the giver. This is so even if the giver is merely fulfilling what she or he takes to be an expectation. The recipient will probably also give a gift in return, unless she is a child or if some other inequality makes reciprocation difficult. Thus many gifts can be viewed as a frilly, inarticulate form of exchange of attention, a concrete demonstration of love, or something of the sort.

Shopping as Part of a Creative (and Therefore Potentially Attention-Getting) Act

A large number of things purchased are for display to others in some form. Such is obviously the case with many clothes, those not purely utilitarian, or maybe even those. But this also holds for furniture for electronic devices, for foods, whether to be combined into something cooked for others or merely as a display as the purchaser herself eats them in semi-public. Cars are also in this category. Sometimes the way things bought are combined is intended to be a kind of artistry, and of course our bodies and what we have on them have been the main way we get direct attention in the world,. This accounts for gyms, cosmetic surgery, ordinary cosmetics, jewelry, shoes,  diet foods, tattoos and more.

Purchasing of the Means for Expression that Will (It is Hoped) Get Attention.

Here I mean everything from art supplies to iPhones, including cameras, musical instruments, computers and much software, even sound and video systems for home use but also to show off our discoveries to friends and others. Even a substantial portion of business-related (and thus deductible) purchases are in this category. In addition to giving such things to ourselves, we can also give them to others with the intent that we will share in some sense in the attention that goes to the expression thereby made.

Attention-Seeking in Other Ways Competes with Shopping and Will Do So More

As I have discussed before, the act of shopping itself of course takes up the shoppers attention, and so the extent it can be done is limited. Further, as I also pointed out, making any use of anything one buys requires further attention. But shopping also takes money, and with money growing increasingly questionable and perhaps hard to get hold of, means of seeking attention that rely less extensively or not at all on shopping would be much sought substitutes. They are certainly available, at least for those who have Internet or cell phone access and the like, and I think that if and when the smoke clears for the money-market economy, non-monetary attention- seeking  activities will be more prominent. The advantages of shopping as a means of getting attention will quite probably permanently lessen.

The Challenge

Less shopping equals less employment, barring massive government intervention. That would yield lowered money incomes for many. That too will make the Attention Economy more important. But just as the musicians and writers of today want to be heard and read as much at least as they want to be paid, the technologists and designers and so forth will want their works widely distributed if possible, so that they can be appreciated.   I f life is not to get totally imbalanced, ways must be found to see that the good things in life are not reserved for only a small group that has managed to hold onto money or have good money incomes.  Plenty of attention will go to whoever figures out how to make this work. The time to start thinking about it is now.

Having discussed the new strangeness of money as such, I will now turn the most money-dependent sector— finance. But before getting into details, let me make a point about banks and attention. Money flows in the same direction as attention does, and so, right now stars — that is, large scale attention getters — generally have high monetary incomes. But having money incomes doesn’t lower the net attention they have, because attention itself can be thought of as being “stored” in the memories of those who pay it. The more attention you pay someone the more you remember and the more likely you are to pay additional attention. And whenever you do pay attention you tend to have a certain urge to satisfy the attention-getter’s wants.

So despite their high money incomes, stars do not really require conventional banks, because their attention is stored in others’ minds, to be tapped more or less at will. The more attention you have gotten in the past, the easier it is to do this. At the same time, if you have never had attention, your money is not a very good guarantee that you will get attention when you need it. So, as attention transactions gain increasing prominence, the entire financial sector will have a less and less important real role to play. But instead of shrinking, this sector has burgeoned of late, which brings up a second mystery.

The Banking Mystery and the Suspects

In the next-to-last post, I discussed the rapid growth of productivity in typical industries that provide standardized goods and services. The financial sector, you would think, is among the most amenable to automation, since all that is involved is handling and recording the digits that represent money. And that has happened in practice:ATMs; automated credit card accounting; electronic stock exchanges and brokerage services; online banking: etc. In other words, most parts of normal financial transactions are exceedingly automated and require very little actual human attention.

However, the relative size, income, and employment of the financial sector — in this country and others — has grown and grown. Investment banks now spend an increasing portion of their efforts on trading for their own accounts. As with most hedge funds, this typically involve using sophisticated computer programs to find ways to cash in on slight fluctuations or small trends in the financial markets. Banks also package and trade in derivatives that are connected by complex algorithms to the underlying investments in such entities as standardized goods-producing companies, government bonds or real estate.

Derivatives are supposedly financial instruments intended to help minimize risk. If risk really were minimized, the possibility of gaining vast profits would presumably disappear, since profit is supposedly a reward for successful risk taking. To put it another way, if risk were so minimal, many would enter the market for the relatively small gains, which then become even smaller on average. But risk is of course not actually minimized. One reason is that the mathematics of risk minimization, like other mathematical economics, assumes that the basic conditions they describe or even just assume are somehow fixed and unchanging, or that everything had been taken into account in finite equations. Of course everything has never been taken into account; soothing generalities stop working; small risks can add up to huge ones; and risk takers, on average end up with what they came in with or less.

These risks can be taken only because the huge fund of worldwide savings that have no reasonable way of being invested in safe industrial growth  still search for growth somehow. The financial manipulations offer the appearance of such growth, even though it would certainly seem that unless they create money out of nothing, all they earn is merely taken in a game of poker in which someone else — someone with less good financial choices — actually loses.

I am agnostic about whether money is or is not in fact created, since central banks can increase the money supply through lending, and the financial houses who sometimes obtain amazing-appearing returns do so by being highly leveraged, hugely borrowing. Of course, if money can be created out of nothing, it can also disappear just as easily, and there is no reason to suspect that on net that does not happen, so as to balance everything out. (One way it disappears is when overall markets —whether of stocks or housing —  fall, certainly wiping out “paper gains.” A recent report I saw stated that two trillion dollars worth of “actual wealth” has been wiped out with declining real estate prices? Actual wealth? The houses of course are still there, for the most part, and standard economics teaches that the actual value of something is the current market value, so of course the wealth that disappeared was entirely notional, even though it was a notion central to many people’s financial planning. So much for finance, I guess.)

Of course, even if the money that is destroyed equals the money created, most players do not end up even. The banks, hedge funds, and brokerage houses probably have enriched their shareholders, and certainly their main partners and and a large subset of their employees, essentially by grabbing for themselves an ever-larger share of total incomes in each country. These unequal shares of income then head back into the global money fund, for they mostly are not used for buying things.

The Home-Run Kings

A considerable proportion of people employed as “quants,” analysts, traders, and brokers receive many times the monetary income of others with similar talents employed outside finance. They receive much of this in bonuses, supposedly connected with the profits of the firms or the departments of firms they work for. Yet, of the hundreds of billions of dollars made in the last few years by the major investment banks, even more has been lost this year alone. Nonetheless, far from being expected to pay back their past years’ oversize earnings, those still employed might even be paid similar bonuses this year. Some percentage of these bloated bonuses are however used for buying luxuries of all sorts, which does increase employment and to an extent greater than the mass-produced goods sector can do does spread wealth around a bit. (As I discussed last time, luxuries are highly attention-related.)

To some extent the financial stars seem to think of themselves in a manner analogous to sports superstars. The latter generally sign multiyear contracts with teams that offer high remuneration even if the player or team should experience a prolonged “slump.” Similarly, financial stars, good at playing a game of their own, think they deserve healthy bonuses even if they have lost fortunes instead of  gaining them.

Another way to look a the rococo rise of the financial sector and its complex and unstable “products” and its “masters of the universe” is in the same terms as that of the nobles in say the period of Louis XIV of France. He had inherited a country full of the heirs of actual fighting feudal nobles, but he confined them to Versailles and turned them into dandies who did his bidding as they vied with each other for the most luxurious and remarkable clothes and hairdos, the best coaches and castles, etc. The competition that had taken the form of fighting was now both exaggerated and highly artificial. As they strolled through Versailles and its environs , the nobles wore bejeweled and beauteous swords and daggers, and in some cases knew how to use them, but these swords were no match for the muskets, pistols, and cannons in use by that time by actual armies. We can think of the stars of the financial sector as for the most part playing comparably decorative roles, even though apparently involved in what is most central and important for the old economy, namely money.

“Safe as Houses”

I think the complicated play-acting of the financial sector was bound to lead to an eventual fiasco, many orders of magnitude larger than, say, the Long-Term Capital Management fall of 1998 or the Enron catastrophe of 2001. As the finance sector continued to grow in apparent wealth,  more and more people would have come to depend on its inherent fallacy, until some point was reached where it proved quite incapable of actual delivery. However, the fact that the actual fiasco involved ordinary people’s homes and their putative value only helped both prolong an untenable situation and led to the effects oft ultimate crash being far more far-reaching.

If someone were to tell you that some standardized kind of good — whether it be a car, a computer or a corkscrew — could never go down in price but will always grow in value, you would consider them insane. After all, ordinary industrially produced goods become ever easier to replace,  wear out, become obsolete, or just lose their panache. But for some reason when similar optimism was expressed about very nearly mass-produced homes, too many people were willing to take the pronouncement as quite sane. “Real property” requires land, and supposedly “they aren’t making land anymore.”  Unfortunately, that statement is nonsense in several ways.

In the first place — as anyone who has ever looked at open houses offered by realtors or developers should know — much more than with ordinary mass-produced goods, they aren’t selling material objects, they are selling dreams. These are dreams of refuge, privacy, independence, marital concord, healthy and happy children, visits by friends and family, comfort,  warmth, praise from one’s friends, attention from strangers, beauty, ease, neighborhood, community, good schools, convenience — along with other emotionally tinged and historically contingent prospects. Dreams are subject to change, and the reality that supposedly underlies them can easily change too. An easy commute can become congested and overlong; neighbors can turn out not be nearly as nice as the ones one left, community spirit may not exist or may not welcome one; or an area with enough water for nice lawns can be affected by permanent shortages, especially as climate changes. And the gadgets, appurtenances, style and substance of a house or condo can become obsolete, come to seem ugly, or just fall apart.

What about that idea that the amount of land is fixed and invariable, so that, with a growing world population it is in increasingly short supply, and therefore intrinsically worth more and more? It just doesn’t hold water. The value of land, quite obviously, depends on where it  is and how it is looked upon, and both those things are subject to change, down as well as up. Land that was once highly desirable can become noisome and polluted, or just out of fashion, as home designs or sub-divisions can.  And, in effect, new land can be created every time it seems desirable — say — to live closer in to other people — perhaps in high-rise buildings rather than in a suburban houses. (Some land actually is “reclaimed” — created— from bodies of water or marshland, and though ecologically that might be undesirable, it still happens.)

Clearly though, real estate and housing related securities have a certain aura of security among people who don’t stop to think “concretely” of how very abstract the notion of ever-rising home prices is and always has been. The twenty-somethings who serve as the basic laborers in the field of investment banking may have had no knowledge or experience of land bubbles, but more mature people in those businesses seem to have been equally willing to be fooled by what they should certainly have understood better.

What makes mortgages even less reliable investment was little examined: in a typical case of foreclosure,the costs and right offs apparently can amount to upwards of 30% of the face value of the mortgage. The sliced, diced packages of mortgages seemed to lower the chances of such danger, while in fact making any analysis of risks much harder. The invention of newer and newer mortgage “products” that allowed introductory teaser rates with later sharp rate increases simultaneously gave investors the feeling that they would get good returns while greatly enlarging the pool of new home buyers. This further inflated housing prices, making the investments seem even more reliable. The chances of catastrophic failure grew ever larger.

And of course, all this would not have happened had it not been that all this funny money were chasing good investment opportunities while actual industrial growth could not offer nearly enough of an outlet. At the same time, the mortgage mess, etc.,would have been much less problematic if incomes had been less unequal. In that case, there would have been less money chasing investments, but more chance for ordinary people to pay more ordinary mortgages. That, however, is just what things once were like, in the US anyway. Whether they can be like that again, I tend to to doubt.

In a subsequent post, I will add to the prognostications and solutions I offered earlier.

In the previous post, I pointed out that money is of great importance  only when the world is dominated by standardized goods and services. One essential of standardization is  that goods or services of a certain type are interchangeable. This ton of wheat equals that one, this 100 watt lightbulb equals that one, this kwh of electricity equals that one, and so on. In some cases (actually even in these cases) one has to specify more to get an acceptably  equivalent product or service, sometimes much more. For instance, 50 cycle per second, 220 volt  electricity is not equivalent to the 60-cps, 110-volt kind. Still, in both these cases, only a few numbers define the electrical service, and there are still huge numbers of completely interchangeable kilowatt hours of each kind of electricity available depending on where you get service.

As the electricity example indicates, much standardization is based on the growth of science and scientific measurements. But of course such measurements extend beyond science. Consider, let us say. men’s size 16-and-1/2, 34 white no-iron Oxford cotton, button-down, long-sleeved dress shirts (this is in American measures; to find equivalent European measures, e.g., a conversion table must be used). Any large men’s store will carry such shirts, and quite often a variety of styles and brands within the category. The different styles will not generally be exactly the same fit, and the prices will not be exactly the same either, though all the shirts of one size, style and brand will be identically priced. Also,the most expensive shirt of this general description will probably be priced at no more than about five or ten times the cheapest. The more expensive ones probably carry designer labels. You pay more because this designer adds a certain “class” to the clothing — a classiness that should be reflected in how you will appear to others. Men occasionally and women quite regularly seek out designer brands of clothing of all sorts, and some of it departs quite a bit from being highly standardized. Here, a large part of the markup in price is a kind of payment to the designer as a result of the attention she or he has gotten. (Wearing such clothes, you can hope to get a little of the attention that “rubs off” as much of it heads for the designer.)

Money’s Two Components

Thus, we can think of both goods and services as having two components in their prices: the standard component — in which the designer is indistinguishable from the herd, as if the item were not specially designed at all — and the attention part.

This is in accord of course with what Kevin Kelly reminded us I had indicated earlier about the fact that if you gain attention, you will also be able to have money flow to you. As with goods, in a sense we have to conceptualize the money we keep track of as having two components, the standardized component and the attention -connected component. A certain proportion of money transactions are completely standardized: wages of industrial workers used to buy standardized goods, and the profits that go to those who own and run such businesses. Other money transactions, such as buying designer jeans or contributing to the campaign of a political star are more mixed or virtually all attention related.

How Much Money Goes With How Much Attention?

Now let’s observe a couple of peculiarities of the attention-paying component. If people pay you attention, you generally can, if you want, receive money, and generally speaking the more attention you get, the more money you can pull towards you. This is as true of Damien Hirst, the artist, as of Osama bin Laden, the terrorist, or Giorgio Armani the clothing designer. For all three, in addition to the money, there are the fans —and the enemies too. (If bin Laden had no enemies, he would have far fewer fans, and probably the same goes for Hirst, even though in his case the enemies are not out to kill. To some degree, you receive attention by standing out, which has to mean in some way opposing the norm, the standards, and thereby, you also create some enmity.) However, a key point is there so no way to assign a definite monetary value to having a certain amount of attention.

Another thing one might hope to do with attention is buy it. Advertisers try it all the time. Some educators try to bribe their students to pay attention with offers of cash. One generally tries to buy the attention of any sort of professional — doctor, lawyer, editor, psychotherapist, tutor, architect — whom  one hires. But, in all these cases, there is no necessary correlation between the amount of money one pays and the amount of attention one gets. This is also true for the services of chefs, restaurant servers, flight attendants, etc. Are they really acknowledging who you are and what you really want when you ask, or are they to a greater or lesser extent treating you as just another random customer, with perhaps the same uniform politeness and smiles they would show anyone else? That depends you: Can you win or have you won their true attention?

A Side Remark About Luxuries

A corollary to all this: Luxuries (of the kind one buys) are basically non-standard goods or  services. They generally have large components of star connections —works of art, designer clothes, restaurants with renowned chefs, and so on. Thus the money flows to stars, to a good extent, even though they may mostly recycle it. In addition, many luxuries imply that the recipient gets a great deal of personal attention, which like any attention, cannot be relied on equally by all purchasers. Still the purchase of luxury goods, because of their usually less assembly-line production do employ more people than the standardized goods and services that the average person can mostly hope for.

Back to Money and Attention

Meanwhile, advertisers pay for the size of audiences for the surrounding attention-getting material, but that by no means guarantees how many in the audience will pay the slightest attention to the ad. Still less does the money paid indicate how many in the possible audience will be moved enough by the ad to buy what is advertised. (A very attention-getting ad often draws more attention to its creator than to the product advertised. We may not know the name of this person, but we will think to ourselves “what a clever ad,” meaning “I like the mind behind this.” )

Two Conclusions to Remember

Neither through attracting nor being sold does attention go with a definite amount of money. So as attention-paying and seeking and even receiving all grow in importance   we can expect two results:

1. A larger and larger fraction of all the money in circulation will go to net attention-getters, i.e., stars;

And

2. This growing non-standardized relationship to money will render definite amounts of money more and more meaningless in most cases.

Money Gets Stranger

We now have a situation in which in the rough way this happens, less and less money, comparatively, goes to the invisible, non-stars —such as factory workers, who churn out the standardized goods, along with many kinds of service worker — while a relatively larger fraction flows to attention-getters, even fairly modest attention getters such as typical doctors or lawyers or yoga instructors.

Note that this is not the same as inflation, or deflation for that matter. The “money supply” may rise —possibly by orders of magnitude — while the prices of standardized goods —quickly churned out to meet whatever the level of demand — stay more or less flat. Every unit of money is of course exactly the same, and in fact quantities of money can certainly bedazzle, but all this is symptomatic of the passing of the era in which money was a bedrock part of reality. To see what is going on with it, I will next time focus on financial institutions, such as banks, where money alone is the standardized good.

Next time: banks, etc.